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 Archaeologists investigating the emergence of large-scale societies in the past have renewed 
interest in examining the dynamics of cooperation as a means of understanding societal change over 
time within human groups and organizational variability among them. Unlike earlier approaches to 
these issues, designated voluntaristic or managerial models, contemporary research articulates more 
explicitly with frameworks for cooperation and collective action employed in other fields, thereby 
facilitating empirical testing through better definition of the costs, benefits, and social mechanisms 
associated with success or failure in coordinated group action. Current scholarship is nevertheless 
bifurcated along lines of epistemology and scale, which is understandable but problematic for forging 
a broader, more transdisciplinary field of cooperation studies. In this paper we point to some areas of 
potential overlap by reviewing archaeological research that foregrounds the dynamics of social 
cooperation and competition in the emergence of large-scale societies, which we define as those 
possessing larger populations, greater concentrations of political power, and higher degrees of social 
inequality. We focus on key issues involving the communal-resource management of subsistence and 
other economic goods, as well as the revenue flows that undergird political institutions. Drawing on 
archaeological cases from across the globe, with greater detail from our area of expertise in 
Mesoamerica, we offer suggestions for strengthening analytical methods and generating more 
transdisciplinary research programs that address human societies across scalar and temporal spectra.   
In the interests of developing more nuanced theories of human sociality, researchers across the 
social and behavioral sciences recognize the need to consider both the agency of actors differentiated 
by power, status, wealth, and other factors, as well as the societal norms and institutions that sustain 
these divisions and serve to structure action. Archaeologists interested in such pursuits seek to 
understand broader patterns as well as the contingencies of culture and history.1,2  We contend that 
frameworks grounded in the logics of evolutionary cooperation theory and collective action theory offer 
the best alternative for examining the dynamics of human sociality over the long trajectories that 
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archaeologists and evolutionary anthropologists study.3,4  Nevertheless, researchers investigating such 
issues often talk past one another. Research following evolutionary cooperation theory relies heavily 
on the logic of games, mathematical models for how cooperative norms may develop and proliferate 
within certain social groups, and methods involving surveys or experimental games focused on 
smaller populations. In contrast, research drawing from collective action theory primarily relies on the 
logic of group resource management (e.g., public goods or common-pool resource problems), 
consideration of how certain social institutions encourage or discourage cooperation, and methods 
involving cross-cultural comparison focused on larger populations. Citation patterns vary accordingly, 
with researchers who follow evolutionary cooperation theory looking more to the mathematical logic 
exemplified by works such as Maynerd Smith5 and Boyd and Richerson6, while those who follow 
collective action theory look to the cultural details and comparisons exemplified by works such as Levi7 
and Ostrom.8   
We do not see this divide as entrenched and find productive lines of archaeological investigation 
within the evolutionary cooperation literature and the collective action literature. Scholars outside of 
archaeology have commented on such disciplinary divisions and have begun productive cross-
disciplinary dialogs. To cite only one example, Coakley and Nowak9 explore connections between 
evolutionary approaches to cooperation and the complex philosophical issues covered in more 
humanistic disciplines such as religious studies. In this paper we proceed in a similar spirit with the goal 
of identifying areas of overlap between cooperation theory and the archaeology of large-scale societies, 
with the hopes of fostering greater complementarity in lines of research.    
 
The Archaeological Record of Large-Scale Cooperation 
Cooperation is not unique to any set of societies, cultures, or eras, but viewing the dynamics of 
cooperation cross-culturally and diachronically provides insight into why human groups vary and 
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change. Extant models for the evolution of cooperation are often highly abstract in depicting unspecified 
public goods whose procurement individual actors could cooperate towards or defect from.10 The goal 
of developing these models is to demonstrate what mechanisms are theoretically plausible. When 
actual data are considered, the mechanisms can become clouded by problems of correlation and 
equifinality. Nevertheless, researchers who engage in cross-cultural analysis regularly deal with such 
problems and have developed methods for parsing the relative weight of certain factors over others.11,12 
When public goods are specified, researchers studying the evolution of cooperation among small groups 
direct attention primarily to the importance of increasing returns to scale from endeavors such as 
cooperative hunting or fishing of big game, mutual defense, and resource management.13 Major 
research themes tend to deal with subsistence, demographic patterns, and raw material acquisition and 
exchange. Researchers following collective action frameworks focus more on variability in political 
organization and the financing of political institutions (the macro-scale).14 They, in turn, pay less 
attention to the causal linkages of certain variables, such as calculations on the part of individual actors 
(the micro-scale) for payoffs in group management of resources or the strength of norms, monitoring, 
and the effects of sanctions for noncompliance.   
Archaeology is the discipline that offers the most varied and chronologically deep material 
record of human social change relevant to modelers and theorists who study issues such as the 
development, maintenance, and breakdowns of large-scale cooperation.15 A promising trend for 
increased transdisciplinarity is the greater collaboration between theoretical modelers and field 
archaeologists in examining such issues. Recent examples of such collaboration, drawing only from the 
archaeology of the pre-Columbian Americas, include the investigation of topics such as village dynamics 
within the Ancestral Puebloan world, urban organization at the ancient Mexican metropolis of 
Teotihuacan, relationships between urbanization and water resources in the Maya lowlands, and 
heterarchical political organization in Colombia.16-19 In all of these cases the models lose generalizability 
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in order to accommodate the cultural and historical contingencies of the particular cases, but they gain 
explanatory power as a result.  
 In the sections to follow we offer suggestions for how the archaeology of large-scale societies 
may contribute to broader cooperation research by highlighting certain examples of cross-disciplinary 
investigations already ongoing. We draw from ecologically and economically focused archaeological 
research that may not be explicitly grounded in theoretical frameworks on cooperation or collective 
action, but illustrate how resource problems and revenue streams connect with organizational 
variability in ways consistent with such frameworks. We consider archaeological research in three 
major domains for cooperation and collective action: (1) subsistence dilemmas; (2) economic goods 
and their production and exchange; and (3) the relationship between political financing and the 
allocation of public goods. In Figure 1 we outline how these three domains overlap with respect to the 
variables of exclusion and subtractability as considered in classic works on cooperation and collective 
action by Ostrom20 and others for defining public goods, common-pool resources, toll or club goods, and 
private goods, as well as the gradations between classes of certain goods depending on how they are 
organized. The chart thereby provides a means of implementing the models to evaluate material traces 
of past economic organization commonly found in the archaeological record. 
 
Subsistence Dilemmas 
 Subsistence issues that impact large groups of people represent focal dilemmas in cooperation 
research. We follow other theorists in classifying these issues as dilemmas because they contain the 
possibility that individuals will free-ride or over-exploit resources, but we envision that actual individuals 
would be behaving logically within their bounded rationality and not necessarily view these as dilemmas 
themselves. A few examples of such issues that stand out in the archaeological record, spanning variable 
social scales, are suprahousehold forms of land tenure, food storage, and agricultural intensification. 
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When these involve multiple households they are usually classed as common-pool resource problems 
and therefore are critical to understanding the dynamics of group behavior in the past. They 
nevertheless all vary in their degrees of archaeological visibility. Understanding past land tenure usually 
requires textual evidence, though archaeological studies by Kohler,21 Oosthuizen,22 and others also have 
interpreted them through material remains including the presence of field houses, boundary markers, 
and the spatial distribution of houses on the landscape. Single houses adjacent to small fields are 
inferred to represent private landholding, whereas multiple houses with unimpeded access to larger 
fields are inferred to represent more communal holding and/or management. These relationships may 
accurately characterize certain contexts, but anthropologists and archaeologists must be more explicit in 
defining property regimes.23 Drawing from the work of Ostrom, Acheson24 suggests definitions with 
archaeological utility, such as varieties of common-property regimes, cases of de facto use rights on 
otherwise private property, and the difference between rights to access, extract, or manage resources.    
Storage facilities often have higher archaeological visibility than do past systems of land tenure 
and have been modeled as an evolutionary cooperation issue by Angourakis and colleagues.25 Variability 
in the economics and cultural norms of storage can nevertheless account for much of the variability in 
its organization. For instance, archaeologists working in Mesoamerica note that limitations on the 
transportation of staple goods such as food posed by an environment lacking pack animals resulted in 
underdeveloped storage infrastructure,26 but may have simultaneously encouraged the development of 
markets as a system of distribution, discussed in the section to follow.  Still, a Mesoamerican example of 
suprahousehold food storage that would fit the model proposed by Angourakis and colleagues was 
recently proposed by Carballo and collegues.27 
 Forms of agricultural intensification that involved the coordinated labor of multiple households 
are the most archaeologically conspicuous of these subsistence dilemmas since they involve irrigation, 
terracing, and other means of landscape modification. Irrigation has for centuries been a major 
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explanation for the emergence of larger populations seen in the archaeological record of various world 
regions, particularly arid ones. A recent model for the emergence of hierarchical leadership from 
egalitarianism based on cooperation for a resource analogous to an irrigation system is presented by 
Powers and Lehman.28 The model demonstrates a possible path to despotism of a “Wittfogelian” sort, 
but could be developed further to encompass the variability in levels of collectivity in systems of 
irrigation and land tenure documented historically. For instance, variability in the scale, organization, 
and broader societal implications of such systems could be more productively explored by considering 
variance in maintenance, rule conformance, and water supply discussed for a sample of 47 irrigation 
systems by Ostrom and colleagues,20 or the differences between more and less communal agricultural 
regimes highlighted in a recent study of China by Talhelm and colleagues.29   
Environmental factors impacting water supply and forms of hydraulic engineering can be 
defined through archaeology as well, or by evaluating prehistoric cases in the light of comparative 
historical cases. An example of the latter is work done by Hunt and colleagues30 who conclude that 
Hohokam irrigation of the American Southwest is consistent with forms of communal management, 
rather than with private, acephalous, or state-managed models. Similarly, in reviewing the trajectory of 
irrigation systems in ancient Iran, an exemplar of earlier despotic models, Wilkinson and colleagues31 
conclude that the smaller networks of the Chalcolithic and Bronze Age are consistent with a model of 
niche-construction, whereby individuals with lower levels of political integration organize their built 
environments through more bottom-up mechanisms. They track the spread of larger, Iron Age systems 
in tandem with imperialistic regimes, but do not find conclusive evidence for their hierarchical 
imposition. In a study of the similarly arid region of the coastal Andes, Netherly32 detected no evidence 
for imperial control of irrigation under the Chimu or Inca, and found management by corporate groups 
termed parcialidades in the ethnohistoric literature instead. Irrigation in arid and hydraulically 
circumscribed regions is necessary to expand growing area, whereas the resource-management 
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calculus is different in semiarid highlands that receive adequate annual precipitation but on a strongly 
seasonal cycle, or with the possibility of frost. In such areas, including the highland Andes and 
Mesoamerica, smaller canal systems that humidify fields early in the growing season or raised-field 
systems along lakeshores can mitigate the risks posed by marked seasonality.33-35 The undulating terrain 
of highland regions creates another set of resource problems since the expansion of fields or mitigation 
of erosion can involve suprahousehold labor for construction and maintenance. In southern highland 
Mexico, for example, farmers developed a system of check-dam terraces for cross drainage and erosion 
control called lama-bordos. These strings of small dams required fairly intensive maintenance but labor 
requirements could be met by households or cooperating groups of them during times of labor 
bottlenecks.36,37  
 In more humid regions of the globe, hydraulic works are typically engineered to channel excess 
water. Scarborough and Lucero38 evaluate systems in five well-watered regions of the semitropics—
Amazonia, Angkor, Bali, the Maya lowlands, and the Niger delta—and identify patterns of self-
organization in the creation of low-density urban centers. Hydraulic projects often involved 
accumulating abundant water in reservoirs or draining inundated areas through raised fields, and the 
authors illustrate how both might potentially be implemented at the suprahousehold or community 
level without coercion, operating as heterarchical systems even when part of extremely hierarchical 
polities such as Angkor. More precise definition along the spectrum of resource problems needs to be 
made in these cases, as with those from more arid regions, to capture variability in the objectives of and 
access to such systems. For instance, restricted use reservoirs for temple ritual or palace baths are not 
common-pool resources, whereas pools at which all neighborhood residents could access drinking water 
or channel for agriculture are. These issues overlap with those of the section after next, on political 
financing, but first we turn to other classes of economic goods. 
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Economic Goods and their Production and Exchange 
 Because artifacts are a primary set of data for their analyses, archaeologists have spent 
considerable time attempting to understand the social systems and networks through which their 
production and exchange was realized. In many cases production and exchange were household 
undertakings and therefore are envisioned as private goods that pose few cooperation dilemmas for 
theorists. Yet in others, divisions of labor for net efficiency create mutual dependencies that enmesh 
households for the production and distribution of toll goods by corporate groups who cooperate 
internally and compete externally, such as with producer or merchant guilds. Freer exchange creates 
the possibility of more common-pool resources or public goods issues, as with the maintenance of fair 
marketplaces or open-access roads for transporting goods. Archaeologists have been attuned to such 
issues in weighing the relative contributions of staple and wealth/prestige goods in early economies39 
and the macroregional changes of exchange networks.40 
 Given the hyper-competitiveness of the corporate takeovers and e-trading of today’s global 
markets, the conclusion by Henrich and colleagues41,42 that exposure to markets increases cooperation, 
based on experimental research among small-scale societies, may seem counterintuitive. Yet an 
important variable in considering markets among traditional societies past and present is that most 
exchanges are still done through face-to-face interactions and therefore lack the anonymity of an 
idealized market principle. Marketplace exchange in traditional societies, and also sometimes in 
industrial ones,43 is instead shaped by the dilemma of transcending institutions of political and economic 
power to create more egalitarian settings in which participants can trust that transactions are 
untethered from dominance hierarchies. In a review of preindustrial markets Blanton44 draws on 
collective action theory to examine cross-cultural trends. He notes common strategies of inverting 
dominant social structures through the construction of marketplaces as liminal spaces. They involve 
altruistic punishment and the piggybacking of marketplace exchange onto organizational structures that 
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can uphold a sense of trust and order, such as by positioning them at sites of religious pilgrimage or 
festivals, or associating them with market deities. These issues of resource types and management of 
markets leads to the considerations of our final domain: political financing.   
 
Political Financing and the Allocation of Public Goods 
 The previous two sections demonstrate that cooperation research in archaeology can apply to a 
range of social scales, as institutions such as irrigation systems and exchange networks are integral to 
both smaller and larger groups. In its focus on the political economy and public goods, the comparative 
literature drawing on collective action theory deals mostly with large-scale societies, such as premodern 
cities, states, and empires—although we see the insights of this research as applicable to smaller-scale 
societies and, conversely, see how the evolutionary cooperation literature applies to larger formations. 
In earlier publications Feinman and colleagues45,46 considered how societies vary in their organization 
along continua alternatively labeled corporate/network, inclusive/exclusive, and 
collective/individualizing.47 Following the comparative analysis by Levi7 that models historical state tax 
systems as a cooperative (n-person) dilemma, Blanton and Fargher14 have expanded significantly on 
these themes with a survey of 30 premodern states that demonstrates correlations between 
organizational variability and whether political financing comes from largely internal or external 
revenues, as this directly impacts the levels of accountability that leaders face from commoners and the 
likelihood that governance will be shared (oligarchic, democratic) or individualized. In addition to 
greater accountability for governing authorities, higher levels of internal financing and communal 
resources also correlates with higher dissemination of public goods and bureaucratization of civic 
offices. 
 Researchers such as Richerson and Boyd48 and Turchin49 also apply the logic of evolutionary 
cooperation to explain the ultrasociality of large-scale societies. Both consider calculations where the 
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returns of mutual cooperation are higher than defection, and the role of leaders or incipient forms of 
governance in transforming zero-sum conflicts for individuals into aggregate gains. Blanton and Farger14 
provide a nuanced scheme for classifying revenue streams and assessing their relative weights among 
diverse cases. Internal revenues include taxes on market transactions, basic agricultural and craft 
production, and labor; external revenues include state-controlled land, war booty and imperial 
extraction, state-controlled trade or tax thereof, and direct control of labor or spot resources. Public 
goods include transportation infrastructure, water supplies, safety, endowments for temples or schools, 
redistributive economic mechanisms, and an evaluation of how broadly these impact commoners away 
from capital cities or other elite centers. The major finding of collective action research on political 
financing and public goods is that societies with an emphasis on internal revenue streams have a 
greater tendency to be organized more collectively and to disseminate public goods to a broader 
populace.   
  The archaeological application of these lessons to contexts with few or no textual sources 
requires their extrapolation to material remains. In Table 1 we outline our logic for evaluating 
archaeological signatures with respect to these axes of collectivity. Again, we note that considerations 
such as revenue streams, landholding, indices of social inequality, politically themed iconography, and 
investments in communal architecture are not exclusive to large-scale societies, though they are all 
commonly discussed in their archaeological study. 
 
Subsistence, Exchange, and Political Financing: An Application to Pre-Columbian Mesoamerica 
 In order to provide a more concrete application of the three domains of cooperation and 
collective action reviewed above we turn to greater detail on cases from pre-Columbian Mesoamerica, 
where we and our colleagues have been documenting a range of variability along these axes.50 Pre-
Columbian Mesoamerica presents an example of profound transformations in the scale of societies 
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associated with changes in labor relations and cooperative networks, rather than with technology. 
Major transformations include early interregional interactions focused on the exchange of prestige 
goods, primarily by elites; the maturation of economies of regional goods associated with the broad 
participation by commoners and early urbanism; and the creation of a more integrated world system 
through the proliferation of markets that mobilized staples as well as bulk luxuries—finer goods widely 
available throughout the socioeconomic spectrum.51 The regional-goods transformation and 
development of markets are of greatest interest to cooperation research. In the first case, the potential 
for exclusion is low but payoffs through suprahousehold cooperation are high.  
To provide a quantifiable calculus of economic goods and their exchange, we may consider the 
potential profits from a craft industry such as fine pressure blades made of obsidian, which are 
abundant archaeologically and whose market value is attested to through sixteenth-century textual 
sources. The production and exchange of this artifact class increased dramatically in association with the 
regional-goods transformation and urbanization of the later Formative period, some two millennia 
earlier. Based on conservative estimates of the quantity of obsidian a merchant would transport, Hirth52 
concludes that the exchange of a single pack worth of blade-cores could have provided a third more 
than the annual supply of maize needed to support a household. Using time approximations for blade 
production,53 and adding travel times for acquisition and distribution, we extrapolate that this could be 
met in a maximum of two months, meaning that subsistence yields could be doubled by a single 
household during the non-agricultural season or even higher returns could be achieved through a 
cooperative division of labor (e.g., cooperation between quarry workers, producers, and merchants). 
Exclusionary access to obsidian would have been practically impossible in Mesoamerica, where many 
flows stretch for tens of kilometers over badlands without resident populations,54,55 making these 
production and exchange dynamics a common-pool resource. Mesoamerican obsidian represents only 
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one example of an array of similar economic goods seen in the world’s archaeological record, and that 
could also be modeled more accurately to meet the specific case.  
Following this intensification in the economic networks associated with regional goods, the 
urban revolution in the southern Mexican state of Oaxaca saw the creation of hundreds of fortified hill-
towns, designed for mutual defense as community architectural projects.56 It is clear from excavations at 
sites such as El Palmillo that networks of residential terraces required suprahousehold labor for 
interconnecting and maintaining terrace walls.57 Here, a town of some 5000 occupants constructed 1400 
terraces tightly packed in one km2 of occupation (Figure 2). Such architectural features represent 
common-pool resources because they required suprahousehold level coordination to construct, and 
failure in any portion adversely impacted multiple households. The occupation of El Palmillo lasted five 
centuries, but episodes of construction and remodeling probably occurred quickly in a coordinated 
manner for large sectors, possibly over one dry season. If we employ common labor calculations used in 
archaeology to estimate 50-140 person days per terrace, we find that El Palmillo’s network of terraces 
represents approximately 52,000 person days of construction, while smaller sites in the region would 
total the low thousands.36   
 This example relates to a general trend seen in Mesoamerica and in other cases of premodern 
urbanism whereby neighborhoods in settlements with denser populations appear to have fostered more 
collective action than low-density urbanism.57-59 The proposal can also be evaluated quantitatively by 
comparing houses or their associated holdings, as has been done recently by Smith and colleagues60 
using a sample from central Mexico. The study calculates the Gini index, used commonly for 
contemporary social science research on inequality, based on variability in archaeological house and 
room size and, when available, textual accounts of landholding. Consistent with the suggested trend of 
urban density and collectivity, Teotihuacan—one of the largest, most nucleated cities of the ancient 
Americas—ranked as the lowest Gini score, meaning more muted inequality. The city also aligns with 
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most of the collective side of the axis in Table 1. As proposed in a recent model by Froese and 
colleagues,17 some of this collectivity may have been driven by self-organization at the neighborhood 
level.61 
 Early cases of urbanization in Mesoamerica generally appear to have followed more collective 
lines, but the disintegration of these systems led to balkanized political landscapes and power vacuums 
that in many cases were filled initially by smaller kingdoms. The leaders of these smaller polities, in 
contrast to their predecessors, frequently drew power more from external or spot resources, coercive 
military practices, and interpersonal networks, expressing the trappings of nobility without returning 
many public goods. It is possible that this trend applies to many, although clearly not all, sequences in 
other parts of the world, since early urban centers such as Uruk, Harappa and Mojenjo-Daro, late 
Neolithic northern China, and Initial Period coastal Peru also seem to have modest burials and wealth 
accumulation, and an emphasis on temples or other monumental public architecture rather than on 
palaces. 
We speculate that early urbanization frequently could have followed more self-organizing, non-
coercive principles as cities offered mutualistic benefits;61,62 in contrast, political expansionism was an 
inherently more competitive process since force or the threat of it often is associated with marked 
growth in the spatial extent of political control or dominion.63,64 
   
Conclusions and Future Prospects 
 In this overview, we have illustrated potential intersections and synergies between research 
drawing from evolutionary cooperation theory and collective action theory, and where the archaeology 
of large-scale societies can facilitate connections. Explanation of the development and organizational 
variability of large human agglomerations of the past requires consideration of the micro-scale of 
individual or small-group strategies, exemplified by studies drawing on evolutionary cooperation theory, 
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but they cannot be accounted for by these foundations alone. In this paper we propose an approach 
drawing on frameworks for cooperation and collective action that considers the relations between 
individuals and the macro-scale of institutions and structures that are the product of individuals and 
their interrelations, but cannot simply be reduced exclusively to them. 
Archaeological findings, sometimes supplemented by documentary records, offer comparative 
trajectories of cooperation in large-scale societies in realms such as subsistence, production and 
exchange, and the relationship between political financing and public goods. We have provided 
frameworks that more explicitly connect types of resource-management issues, based on their 
subtractibility and exclusion, and indices of the collectivity in institutions to remains commonly 
encountered in the archaeological record. These provide empirical referents that can be employed to 
actualize the cost/benefit calculations of many cooperation models, as do calculations of labor in 
construction or craft production longstanding to archaeological analyses, and newer applications such as 
Gini indices for evaluating inequality. Such grounding is critical because it provides a basis to realistically 
consider culture and the fluidity in composition of large-scale societies seen in comparative historical 
cases, and can more productively account for the marked degrees of regional and temporal variation in 
the ways that humans have and have not cooperated.65 In turn, such models provide archaeologists with 
means to give greater consideration to individual agency and motivations in the assessment of past 
processes that they tend to observe at more macro-scales over time and space. Increased collaboration 
between modelers and field archaeologists holds promise for a more transdisciplinary field of 
cooperation research unhindered by the artificial divide often constructed between the distant past and 
the present, and focused to account for both the cross-regional parallels and the diversities that 
characterize humanity’s global career.    
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Table 1   
More Collective Less Collective 
Internal revenues: regularized taxation, a focus on 
staple finance and regional goods 
External revenues: long-distance trade, 
importance of portable wealth, spoils of war, 
control of spot resources 
More communally owned or managed land Less communally owned or managed land 
Fewer disparities of wealth in life and death  Greater disparities of wealth in life and death 
Greater potential for shared power Greater potential for individualized power 
Political ideology emphasizes abstract principles of 
offices and strength of the polity, cosmology and 
fertility 
Political ideology emphasizes lineal descent 
systems for succession and legitimation, divine 
kingship and royal patron deities 
Not centered on palaces Centrality of palaces 
Monumental architecture fosters access (e.g., open 
plazas, wide access-ways, community temples)  
Monumental architecture fosters exclusivity 
(e.g., elite tombs and memorials, dynastic 
temples) 
Higher expenditures on public goods Lower expenditures on public goods 
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Table 1. Axes of collectivity for premodern complex societies. 
 
Figure 1.  Classification of types of goods with examples of variable axes used in the archaeology of 
complex societies. 
 
Figure 2.  Map and photograph illustrating the western, heavily terraced face of El Palmillo (Oaxaca, 
Mexico). Arrows on the photo correspond to the blackened spaces on the map, where excavations 
confirmed pre-Columbian occupation and residential terrace construction and maintenance that were 
carried out over centuries during the first millennium A.D.  The map also provides a record of areas with 
dense terrace construction that were not excavated.   
 
